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In the Supreme Court 
of the '\State of Utah 
LEON STUCKI, 
P_aintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
JAMES ELLIS, W. H. STE-
WART, JUNES. SPACKMAN, 
CLARE SPACKMAN, TH10'M-
AS A. TARBET, and 1\1AG-
NUS OLSEN, 
Defendants, and Appellant 
THOMAS A. TARBET. 
Respondent's 
Brief 
STATEMENT OF FACTS. 
The statement of facts in appeUant's brief is in-
complete and misleading as to a correct picture of ~11 
of the facts, hence we make the following statement 
of the facts in this case, as alleged and/ or admitted 
in the pleadjngs, or by the parties in their testimony, 
or as found by the Court. 
June S~ Spackman, daughter of defendant W. H. 
Stewart, was the record owner of the premises in 
question from October 9, 1945 to March 1, 1946. On 
October 16, 1945, she entered into a written agreement 
to se"'l said premises to one James Ellis for $1,000, of 
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which $400 was paid by Ellis as a down payment; the 
balance, $600, was payable at tne rate o.t ~lu pe1.· 
month. That contract IS an exhibit in evidence. W. 
H. Stewart adm1tted that he acted as agent for his 
daughter, June, both in buying and selling said prem-
ises. (Tr. 42, 4.8, 59, 61) James Ellis with his wife 
and children immediately moved into possession of 
said premises. Shortly thereafter the dwelling was 
partia ly destroyed by fire. The title to the premises 
was never in Ellis's nam.e, but remained in June S. 
Spackman until she deeded the premises to appellant 
Tarbet March 1, 1946. 
Concerning the allegations in tr~e complaint that 
plaintiff was induced to do the repair work by the re-
presentations of defendant Stewart that the premises 
were insured and that he would see that plaintiff got 
his money as scon as the repair work was done, the 
Court found in its finding No. 3, as follows: 
The Court finds that after said premises had 
thus been partially destroyed by fire, the p,aintiff 
was induced to repair the same by said James 
Ellis and W. H. Stewart, under promise and agree-
ment by them to pay the repair bill in full as soon 
as the work was completed. IThat said W. H. 
Stewart represented to plaintiff and his agent 
that said premises was covered by fire insurance, 
and that he would see that plaintiff's money was 
ready as soon as the repair work was completed. 
(This part of the finding is supported by the testi-
mony of Roy Earl. Tr. 24, 27, 29, 31) But in this 
connection, the C!ourt further finds that the mo-
tion for dismissal and non-suit against said W. H. 
Stewart was granted by the Court at the c,ose 
of the plaintiff's case for the reason that under 
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the Statute of Frauds, the defendant Ste~wart 
would not be liable on an oral agreement to answer 
for the debt or default of the defendant James. 
Ellis. 
Plaintiff's testimony is not disputed that plaintiff 
repaired said premises dring the period from January 
2nd to January 23, 19-16 nor that the cost of repair 
was $323.87. \\rhen the repair bill was presented to 
Stewart and paym.ent refused, plaintiff, on lVIarch 15, 
1946, filed his notice of mechanic's lien against said 
pr~mises, as provided by statute. This is a suit to 
forec.ose said mechanic's lien. 
In paragraph No. 6 of the Findings the. Court 
found. 
The Court further finds that defendant 
Thomas . ..-!\.. Tarbet purchased the said pre111ises 
about the first day of lVIarch, 1946, at which time 
a deed was made by June S. Spackman and· hus-
band, Clare Spackman, to d~efendant Tarbet. · That 
defendant James Ellis did not have title or owner-
ship in said premises in his name but merely had 
a contract for the purchase thereof at the time 
he sold his interest in the premises, about Febru-
ary 25, 1946. 
James Ellis sold his interest in said premises to 
defendant Thomas A. Tarbet through W. H. Stewart. 
The full purchase price to Tarbet was $1500. The 
facts regarding the said sale, the division of the money, 
were testified to by Stewart, and are stated in para-
graph No. 3 of the Amended Ans\ver of W. H. Stew'art 
as follows: 
That in pursuance to said listing af~oresaid, the 
property \vas sold to the defendant Thomas A. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
4 
Tarbet for a consideration of $1500.00. That at 
the time of said sale the . said James Ellis was 
indebted to the defendants June S. Spackman and 
Cl~re Spackman, in the sum of $610.00, principal 
and interest. That the balance of the proceeds 
of said sale to the defendant Thomas A. Tarbet, 
amounting to $890.00, was disposed of as follows; 
to the defendant James Ellis the sum of $800.00, 
and to Stewart & Harrison, the sum of $90.00, 
to pay commission of $75.00 for making said sale; 
and $15.00 to pay general taxes on the_ property 
for the year 1945, in the sum of $11.80, and $3.20 
for extention of the abstract of tit~e. 
Regarding the question \vhether Thomas A. Tar-
bet was the "head of a family" the Court found in 
paragraph No. 7 as· fo~lows: 
The Court furthe,r finds that defendant 
Thomas A. Tarbet was single and lived with his 
mother as a mer.v1ber of her family and in her 
home about March 23, 19L16, when he got married. 
That shortly thereafter, said Thomas· A. Tarbet 
and wife moved into said premises. That while 
said defendant was in the Armed Services he got 
an allotment of about $50.00 per month f.or his 
mother. That defendant's mother was on relief 
prior to receiving said allotment that she was 
taken off relief while said allotment continued and 
was again restored back on relief after said a.lot-
ment discontinued. 
The facts supporting this finding were largely 
admitted by Tarbet and were testified to by his mo-
ther, l\1ary A. Tarbet~ (Tr.~, 85-9.0). 
ARGU.MENT 
Respondent submits that the trial court made no 
error in its finding of fact number seven, nor in its 
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second conclusion of law, that Tarbet is not entitled 
to ass~rt any hom\3stead exemption adverse to plain-
tiff's forecl·osure of his mechanic's lien herein. 
Tarbet and his n1other both admitted that Tarbet 
lived with his mother in her home and as a men1ber 
of her family. She did not live with her son as a 
member of his family. (Tr. 85-87) Hence Tarbet can-
not qualify as the ''head of his mother's family" as 
, 
specified and defined by statute,-Sec. 38-0-5. 
The fact that he had an allotment of $50.00 per 
month sent home to his mother while he was in the 
Armed Services, (of which it. will not be denied the 
Government supplied $28 per month) would not, stand-
ing alone, make him the head of his mother's family. 
His mother testified that she drew relief from the 
Welfare for a long time prior to receiving the allot-
ment checks; that when the a lotment checl\:.S started 
they (the \tVelfare) stopped her relief checks, and that 
after the allotment checks stopped, "they started me 
on relief again." (Tr. 88) This was admitted by ap-
pellant. (Tr. 90) Hence Tarbet cannot quality .as the 
head of a family and the sole provider for his mother 
-Bunker v. Coons, 21 Utah 164,-and the Court made 
no error in its finding and conclusion in that respect. 
Tarbet admits that he did not get married until 
March 23, 1946, (Tr. 94) and that he and his wife 
even lived with his mother for a while after that, 
bef8re he moved into possession of the property in 
question. (Tr. 95) Ar of these facts clearly show. 
(1) That Tarbet was not the head of his mother's 
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family and (2) that he could make no homestead claim 
in h1s own right until after March 23, l9i!6. B~for~ 
that date plaintiff's lien had long since attached to the 
property. 
After the work had been completed, (January 22, 
19,16) appellant could not defeat plaintiff's lien by 
entering marriage relatiiOnship. Evans v. Jensen, 51 
' Utah 1, 168 P. 762. 
In case at bar, Tarbet did not own or have any 
interest in the property when the repair work was 
done and when the _ ien attached. By statute, Sec. 52-
1-5, plaintiff's lien related back to January 2, 19-16, 
when the work was begun. · 
A homestead right may be asserted only by thos~ 
entitled to the right, and only those may claim the 
homestead exemption who are mentioned in the heme-
stead laws. No one may assert a homestead clailn 
under the doctrine of subrogation. 40 C.J.S. 691. 
Appellant's counsel asks: "Even though Ellis and 
the Spackmans did- not take any affirmative action to 
impress the character of a homestead on the property, 
may Tarbet now do so?' Our answer is, ''No". The. 
statute, Sec. 52-1-3 grants an absolute mechanic's lien, 
without any exceptions, for labor done and materials 
furnished. 'The homestead statute, Sec. 38-0·-1, pro-
vides that the homestead shaii be exempt frd·rri· judg-
ment liens and . execution·· or · f8rced sal "S, but the 
statute does not say the 'homestead shall be -exempt 
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from a mechanics lien. But this Court has held that 
the homestead cla1n1 is exempt from n1echanic' s lien 
if the homestead claim is properly set up and asserted, 
·vol\.er Lun1ber Co. v. Vance, 88 P. 896. 
Hence it is submitted that if Jam,es Ellis had any 
homestead right in that property (which we do not 
concede he had at time of suit) he would have to assert 
and set up such homestead right,-take affirmative 
action to impress the character of a homestead on that 
prop2rty-in order to defeat plaintiff's foreclosure pro-
ceedings. If Ellis had not sold out his interest and 
was still in possession of the property, the plaintiff 
could still foreclose his mechanic's :ien if Ellis did not 
set up and assert his homestead exeimption. Ellis could 
waive that right. In other words the statute does not 
set up the homestead exemption against a m2chanic's 
lien like it does the homestead exemption against j udg-
ment liens. Hence the mechanic's lien when properly 
filed is a lien on the homestead property and can only 
be defeated by affirmatively setting up the homestead 
claim; whereas the judgment lien is no lien at all 
upon the homestead. The statute which appsllant 
relies on merely says th3;t the homestead premises 
may be sold by the homestead claimant, the o'vner, 
free and clear of any judgment lien. 
But counsel says: "The matter is set at rest by 
our statute, Sec. 38-0-2,-'~Th.en . a homestead is c-on-
veyed bv the ovlner thereof,' etc." Our answer is, 
that even if Ell~s had bc€n the ''owner" of the premises 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
8 
at the time he sold out his interest, February 25, 1946~ 
which he was not, tne conclusion reacned by counsel 
doesn't follow. Query, whether Ellis cou1d qua11fy as 
owner? We think it is appellant's fa1lure to observe 
the distinction between mechanic's lien and judgment 
lien, as affecting the hom.estead, that has gotten him 
into his present difficulty. 
The statute, which he quotes, Sec. 38-0-2, says: 
"\Vhen a homestead is conveyed by the owner thereof 
such conveyance shall not subject the premises to any 
li~n or encumbrance to which it wou d not be subject 
in the hands of the owner." This is in harmony with 
Sec. 38-0-1, which says that the homestead is "not 
subject to a judgment lien or forced sale," hence a 
sale of the homestead property does not subject it to 
any such lien or forced sale. The homestead premises 
are, however, subject to the mechanies lien, in the 
hands of the owner, for Sec. 52-1-3 grants a mechanic's 
lien without execeptioiL l-Ienee Sec. 38-0-2 does not 
affect such continuing mechanic's lien,-does not free 
the property from such lien. 
The hom~stead is often spoken of as a shield for 
the protection of the family from creditors of the 
homestead claimant. Now counsel seems to claim the· 
right to stretch and expand this shie,~d, not for the 
r , 
protection of the homestead clainia.nt's family, but as 
a shield over the property itself in the hands of the 
new grantee and for the pr~tection of tl, e new pur-
chaser. This, counsel asserts, is the effect of S3c. 38-
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0-~, even though the new purchaser is not entitled to 
claim a homestead in the pren1ises in his own right; 
eve·n thoug-h he is not the head of a. fan1ily. 
There are t\YO or three additional reasons why 
Tarbet cannot claim or set up any hcm,3stead exemp-
tion to defeat plaintiff's present foreclosure proceed-
ing-: He fai s to specify "'hether he clailns the home-
stead ex"mption of Ellis, or of the Spackmans. We think 
appellant should specify as to whose homestead he 
relies en as his defePse. In addition to the fact that 
as a matter of law Tarbet has no right to claim. set 
up, or ::>~s('rt, the homestead right or exemption of 
P~ther Ell~s or the, Spackmans, we submit that appel-
lant shon1d at least specify on which one he relies. 
wl'"'en he asserts such right. If his answer is that he· 
reli"s on both, then he is in the position of asserting 
that both parties had homestead rights and exemptions 
in the s:"me prop~rty a"'1d at the same tim~,-that June 
Sr;.ackman had a homestead right in that property 
after sh~ executed a contract of sa·e of said premises 
to James Ellis, and let Ellis and his family into pos-
session of the premises. After that contract of sale 
was signed (October 16, 1945) the Spackmans we sub-
mit, had no longer any rig:1t of possession in said 
premises and would have no right to claim any home-
stead tLerein. The record is silent as to where the 
Spack.mans resided or that they signed their nam 3S 
to the contract of sale to Ellis ('October 16, 1945) and 
the deed to conveyance to· Tarbet (March 1, 1946), 
both of which deals and papers their father, W. H. 
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Stewart, made and prepared for them. Hence we do 
not see how June Spackman cou d claim a ho1nestead. 
in that property. Nor did the Spackmans ever assert 
any homestead rights in that property until they 
filed their Answer, in case at bar, which was long after 
they had conveyed the premises to Tarbet by their 
warranty deed. 
James Ellis had S<)ld out his contractual interest 
1n said premises, and no longer had any interest there-
In. We have noted that when Ellis sold his interest 
(February 25, 1946) he got $800 in cash for his equity 
in his contract of purchase. Hence Ellis had aban-
doned his contract of purchas·~. He had lost al his 
right to purchase said premises, as well as any right 
of possession therein. By selling out his equitable in-
terest in said premises he fnrfeited and abandoned 1: :s 
contract and any homestead rights he might have 
had under that contract of purchase. In the case of 
Swanson v. A.nderson, 38 P. (2d) 1065, the Oregon 
court said: 
The right of homestead however does not exist 
after the right of possession is lost, and the right 
of possession ceases when the contract is lawfully 
terminated. 
40 C.J.S. pg 522, reads as follows: 
Forfeiture or abandonment of contract. The hom.e-
stead right is lost with the loss of the rights of 
the purchaser under his contract· for the purcliaser 
of :and. 
To the same effect is Montgomery v. Wise, 62:0:P. · (2d) 
647, (Okla.) CL:arly after Ellis sold out, he could 
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not thereafter cl:1im any hom('stead right in the prem-
ises: so how can appellant no\v claim the right to set 
up Ellis' homestead rights? 
Counsel again asserts that the statute, Sec. 38-
0-2, ''is simple and can mean on y one thing, i.e. if the 
homestead exemption could have been asserted by 
Ellis or the Spackmans then the conveyance to Tarbet 
would not subject the property to the lien of plain-
tiff." Again we repeat that counsel jumps to a l~ong 
unwarranted conclusion and assumes much in , making 
such a statement, which is, of course, not justified 
under the facts and the· law: (1) He assumes that 
Ellis or the Spackmans could have asserted a home-
stead exemption in said prem ~ses, in this ac;tion, which 
we have sho\vn -is not true, and (2) couns·el a'so as-
sumes that if either Ellis or the SpacLmans could 
assert a homestead. claim in said premises (he does 
not bother to designate which) then Tarbet may now 
assert such claim, even though he cannot assert a 
homestead claim in his own right. This is a new and 
unwarranted conclusion under the statute or law which 
he cites. \i\r e have never heard of such a contention 
before. "',r e doubt whether this Court has. Yet for 
support of the major premise of his contention, sub-
rogation of homestead right, couns·el cites no authority. 
Certainly the statute (Sec. 38-0-2) w~ich he cites and 
relies on does not justify or support such a conten-
tion. 
vVe have no quan·el with the law quoted by coun-
sel from 40 C.J.s.· pg 612, nor with any of the other 
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authorities cited on pages 5 and 6 of appC~lant's brief 
to the effect that, "the conveyance does not place the 
creditor in any better posit1on than he was before the 
transfer." We agree to that. We do not claim that 
that plaintiff and respondent is in any better position 
now· than he was before the transfer (conveyance) of 
the property to Tarbet. But neither is the pla~ntiff 
in any worse position. The statute Sec. 38-0-2 does 
not .affect the plaintiff's rights one way or the other. 
We are willing to concede, for the sake of argu-
ment, that if Ellis had not sold out his interest and 
equity in the premises and in his contract of purchase, 
and if Ellis and his family were still in possession of 
and ~iving on the premises and were present in court 
defending against plaintiff's present foreclosure pro-
ceedings, that then Ellis would have the right, if he 
chose to do so, to set up and assert a homestead right 
in said premises which would have the effect of rle-
feating plaintiff's present foreclosure proceedings. But 
that fact does not permit or justify Tarbet's present 
contention that he (Tarbet) is now subrogated to, 
and may set up the hom.estead right of. Ellis, which 
E( lis might have set up if Ellis had not sold out, 
abandoned his right to purchase, and moved aw:ay from 
the premises. 
Appellant, in making such a contention, assumes 
both of his premises, on which his conclusion i~ based. 
Neither of his premises is true, nor in fact exists. 
Thus he assumes, (1) That if Ellis were present in 
court he (E:Iis) could set np a homeste~d claim in the 
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premises. 'rhat is obviously not true, f\)'l· Ellis has 
long since (February 25, 1946) sold out his interest 
in the pren1:ses, abandoned his contract and moved 
a\vay from the premises. El is' whereabouts is un-
kno\vn. (2) Next appellant assum2s that he is sub-
rogated to and may set up and claim the homestead 
rights \\·hich Ellis might have set up and claimed. 
That premise is equally false and untenable. 
\Ve think appellant is in much the same state of 
\vis~1ful thinking as the ardent fisherman was who, 
\vhen asked ho\v many fish he had caught, rep ied: 
"\Yhen I catch this ·one nibbling at my hook, and one 
more, I'll have two." 
CROSS ASSIGNlVIENT OF ER.ROR 
The Court erred in granting defendant W. H. 
Ste\vart's motion for nonsuit and in its dismissal of 
the action as to him. 
The Court granted Stewart's motion for nonsuit 
and dismissal under Sec. 33-5-4 (2) which provides 
that ''every promise to answer fnT the debt, default 
or miscarriage of another" shall be void "unless such 
agreement, or some note or memorandum thereof, is in 
writing subscribed by the party to be charged the1:e-
with." 
\Ve think the facts herein bring defendant Stew-
art within the exceptions provided for in Sec. 33-5-6 
(2) which provides. ''A promise t~o· an~wer for the 
obligation of another in any of the following cases is 
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deemed an o1·iginal obligat1on of the promisor and need 
llOl~ Oe lll WI'l LlHg': 
"(2) Whe1e the creditor parts with value or 
enters 1nt:o an oo1Igat1on in cousH.teration ot tne obli-
gation in respect to WH1ch tne prom1se is mc«1e In 
terrr1s or , under circurnstances s uc11 as to render the 
party making the prom1se the principal cteotor and 
the person in wnose behalf it IS made his surecy." 
If Stewart wasn't the real owner in selling the· 
property to Ellis, he certainly had the same interest 
.and anxiety to have the property repaired. He ad-
mitted he was looking after it and acting for his daugh-
ter June. 
Ellis told the p- aintiff that he was buying the 
property from Stewart and that Stewart said it was 
covered by insurance. But plaintiff was not willing to 
rely on Ellis's statement. Before unde·rtaking to do 
any of the said repair work, plaintiff sent his foreman, 
Roy Earl, with Ellis over- to see W. H. Stewart, so as 
to get that point cle:ar as to who was going to be re-
sponsible,-where the money was c.oming from,-to pay 
.for the repair work. 
In substance Roy Earl testified as follows: "Ellis 
pleaded to have the work done ; said the place was 
insured and that he was buying it from Mr. Stewart. 
Ellis int~cduced me to Mr. Stewart, and said. 'Mr. 
Stewart, I haven't any money to pay for it. I under-
stand this place has insurance on it.' (Tr. 23) Stew-
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art said, 'The· place is covered by insurance, just as 
soon as the work is completed, if you will present 
n1e \Yith a bil I'll see that it is paid.' I told Stewart 
I understood ~lr. Butler · had started to repair the 
prem1ses. Stewart said, 'Mr. Butler has failed to keep 
his agreement, and there is no string attached to it, 
so \Yhen you complete the work, present the bill and 
l'il see that it is paid.' (Tr. 24) 
"~""hen I told Stewart that he had told us the· 
house was covered by insurance, he said, 'the house 
was covered by insurance, but lVlr. Garff had cancelled 
it out.' (Tr. 27)" 
Cross Examination by lVIr. Preston: 
''Q. So \vhen you did the work you reEed on Mr. 
Ste,vart' s statement of insurance? 
"A. Absolute·y. (Tr. 29) Mr. Stewart said 
there \vould be no responsibility on Mr. Ellis' part, 
that we were to present the bill to him and he would 
see that it "'·as paid. Mr. Stewart was to take care of 
the collection of the insurance. He assured us that 
the insurance w9uld pay for the repair work. He asked 
me what the cost of the repair work would be. I 
told him between $300 and $400. Stewart said that's 
a hundred dollars cheaper than Mr. Butler agreed to 
do it for." (Tr. 31) 
The fact that Stew:art. had previou~; y had an 
"~greement" with Butler to do that repair work.· (~ho 
had failed to keep his agreement) is significant, we 
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submit, as showing: ( 1) That Stewart w.a.s the real 
party interested in having said premises repaired, and 
(2') Ste\vart was the man providing the money for ~he 
repair work. Stewart did not deny that part of Earl's 
testimony. Stewart was also interested in knowing 
the estimated amount of the repair bill, which further 
shows that Stewart expected to provide the money. 
In its finding No. 3, the Court found: 
'The Court finds that after said premises had 
thus been partially destroyed by fire, the plain-
tiff was induced to repair the same by said James 
Ellis and W. H. Stewart, under promise and 
agreement by them to pay the repair bFl in full 
as soon as the work was completed. That said 
W. H. Stewart represented to the plaintiff and 
his agent that said premises was covered by fire 
insurance, and that he would see that plaintiff's 
money was· ready as soon as the repair work was 
completed. 
We think the trial court erred in its ruling dis-
missing as to Stewart, for under the circumstances 
ana laCL;S in case at bar ~tewarc· s rep1·esentation tual! 
tue place was utsurred, and. tnat ue would see L-1lat 111e 
money was paid as soon as tne repa1r worK was tlone 
and tne bul presented, was solely relied on by plain-
tiff, and made Stewart the pr1ncipal ouligor. .Plaln-
tiff did not re~y on Ellis to pay tne repcur bill. As 
we have seen, Elis stated right in fron~ of Stewart, 
when he introduced plaintiff's foreman, that he (Ellis) 
had no money. Plaintiff parted with value (labor and 
materials) in respect to the payment of which Stew-
art's Tepresentation ·and promise was "maJ.e in tern1s 
or under circemstances such as to render ·the party 
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making- it (Ste\vart) the prineipal debtor and the per~ 
son 1n \vnose behalf it is made. (Ellis) his surety." 
.~.-\ promise to pay for labor or n1aterials is not 
within the statute where the contract is perforn1ed 
sole y on the credit of the pron1isor, who has a bene-
ficial interest in the performance of the contract. 37 
C.J.S. 540. 
Stewart does not claim that his promise was a col-
lateral ob1igation, or that of a sur~ty for ElEs-that 
Stewart would pay if Ellis didn-'t. Stewart denies that 
Roy Earl ever came and talked to him. The foreman, 
Roy Earl, is not contradicted that E; lis stated right 
in front of Stewart and Earl that he (Ellis) had no 
money. Stewart's state1nent to plaintiff's foreman, 
was definite, clear and unequivocal, that the premises 
were covered by insurance, and that as soon as the 
work was done a::1d the _bill presented, he (Stewart) 
would see it was paid. vVhat statement could be ~ore 
assuring, or would better allay any fears or better 
induce plaintiff and his foreman to pr·nceed and do the 
repair work? 
The p-aintiff relied upon Stewart's promise. He 
did not lock to or expect Ellis to pay for the repair 
bill. Plaintiff did not send the bill to Ellis, but he 
mailed the bill directly to Stewart. This also shows 
that there was no dcubt in plaintiff's mind as to who 
shou~d pay; that plaintiff relied solely upon Stewart 
ard that he exp~cted Stewart to send him a check or 
see that the bill was paid. 
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It was an original obligation, of Stewart, which 
was not within the Statute. It was not a promise to 
pay Ellis' debt. Ellis had no money. Plaintiff was 
not anxious to do that repair work, and did so only 
on Stewart's assurance that the money would be ready 
when the work. was completed. 
It is important to note that Stewart apparently 
thought that he had the insurance policy, for he testi~ 
fied: ''At the time of the fire, I didn't have the insur-
ance. When El is came in after the fire, we got busy 
to find out why he (C:urtis) hadn't brought the insur-
ance in as he agreed to. We found Orson Garff had 
cancelled it. Then immediately I wrote fire insurance 
on the property, but that was after the fire." (Tr. 
57) 
While in the case of .McMillan v. Dick over, 248 P. 
154, the Oregon court held defendant's prom-ise was a 
collateral prom1se, and thus within the statute, the 
Oregon court quotes and states the rules of law appli~ 
cable in concise and c. ear terms. The O·regon court 
uses this language. 
. . . ·If the promise is collateral, it is within the 
statute of frauds and plaintiff cannot prevail; but 
if there is evidence tending to show an original 
obligation on the part of defendant, the finding 
of the jury in reference thereto is conculsive. 
In determining whether a given state of facts 
constitutes an original or a collateral promise, the 
intention of the parties controls, and this must 
be ascertained from the words used in makin 0' 
0 
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the promise, the situation of the parties, and all 
of tne circumstances surrounding the transaction. 
l\Jlasters at al. v, Bidler et al., 101 Or. 322, 198 
P. 912, 199 P. 920; lVIackey v. Smith et al., 21 Or. 
598, 28 P. 974; 25 R.C.L. 489. Where the language 
used by· the parties is ambiguous and the inten-
tion is not clear, it is a question of fact for the 
jury as to whether a promise is origina, or col-
lateral. ~lasters et al. v. Bidler et al., supra; 
l\Iackey v. Smith et al., supra. As stated in 25 
R.C.L. 490: 
"\Vhere the language used, together with the 
surrounding facts and circumstances, makes it 
doubtful whether the parties intended by the 
prom;se to create an original or a co~lateral obliga-
tion. the intention should be determined by the 
jury." 
However, when the facts are undisputed and 
but one reasonable inference can be drawn there-
from, it becomes a question of law for the court 
to determine. 27 R.C.L. 390 ; Breidenback et al. 
v. Upper V:alley Orchards Co., 57 Mont. 247, 187 
P. 1008; l\fasters et al. v. Bidler et al., supra. 
Justice Brewer, in Davis v. Patrick, 141 U.S. 
479, 12 S. Ct. 58, 35 L. Ed. 826, says: 
"* * * The real character of a promise does 
not depend altogether upon the form of expres-
sion, but largely on the situation of the parties; 
and the question always is, what the parties 
mutua~ly understood by the language, whether 
they understood it to be a collateral or a direct 
pro1nise." 
Courts are concerned with substance rather 
than form. 
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The primary inquiry is. To whom was credit 
extended at the time of the sale: Did plaintiff 
rely exclusively upon the credit of defendant, or 
did he merely look to him as a guarantor? Shaw, 
C.J., in Cahill v. Bigelow, 18 Pock. (Mass.) 369, 
quoted with approval in Mackey v. Smith et al., 
supra, thus states the t~st: 
'' 'Was the credit given to the person receiv-
ing the goods? If it was, then such promisor is 
a guarantor on~y, undertaking to pay another's 
debt. If no credit w·ere given to the person re-
ceiving the goods, then . the promisor is himself 
debtor for goods sold to him and delivered to an-
other by his order.' " 
In Brown v. V\Teber, 38 N. Y. 187, it is stated: 
"The test to be applied to every case is, 
whether the party sought to be charged is the 
principal debtor, prilnarily liable, or whether he 
is only liable in case of the default of a third 
person; in ·other words, whether he is the debtor, 
or whether his relation to the creditor is that ()f 
surety to him for the performance, by some other 
person, of the obliation of the latter to the credi-
tor." 
We think the trial court acted with haste, and 
without due consideration, and was also confused as 
t<() the proper rule of law applicable under the statute 
of frauds when applied to the facts in the case at bar. 
At the close of the case the court said: 
THE COURT. As far as the re,:ative material 
facts of this case are concerned, I doubt that 
thPre is much clispPte. I g-rHnterl the nonsuit 
PP''"'~n~t lVTr. StPwart bec~use I felt that it was il1-
~nfl1 hflnt unon fh e plaintiff to prove ownership in 
Mr. Stewart of this property in order to avoid the 
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statute of frauds. The most that can be given 
to the testimony was that Mr. Stewart had re-
presented that there was insurance on the prop-
ert:v and out of that insurance the repair bill 
,\·onld be paid when it was pressnted, and I think 
that is a fact ; but I don't beli~ve that either 
sho"·s o\vnership in Mr. Stewart or any rights 
that he had in the property which would take 
i~ out of the statute of frauds, which requires 
that any· promise to pay for the debts or defau· ts 
or miscarriag-e of any person must be in writin~ 
~nd signPd by the psrson sought to be charged. 
(Tr. ·102) 
Thus the Court -definite·y states that while be be-
lieves that Stewart represented that there was insur-
ance on that property and that out of that insurance 
he \V·C uld see that the repair . bill would be. paid when 
it was presented, yet the c·ourt nevertheless l).eld that 
in as much as plaintiff had failed to prove ownership 
in 1\Ir. Stewart, or that Stewart had any. rights in 
that property, that the case was not taken out of -the 
statute of frauds, and Stewart would not be liable and 
was entitled to a nonsuit. That, lack of ownership 
in Stewart, clear y was an erroneous reas·on on which 
to grant- the nonsuit, and we submit the court erred 
in its_ ruing that on account of such lack of ownership 
or interest in the property in Stewart, his promise 
came within the statute. 
• 
In as much as the Court definitely found that 
defendant W. II. Stewart represented that the prop-
erty was cover0d by fire insurance and that he would 
see that plaintiff's m·r'noy was ready as soon as the 
rcpa;r ,vork was completed, respondent submits, as a 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
22 
matter of law, that he is now entitled to judgment 
against W. H. Stewart as the party primarily liable 
for plaintiff's repair bill that that the ru; ing of the. 
trial court granting a nonsuit as to Stewart should 
be reversed., and the trial court should be directed to 
enter judgment against W. II. Stewart personally for 
the amount of plaintiff's repair bill, costs, etc., as 
prayed for in the complaint. 
Respondent submits that from the facts in the 
record and as found by the trial court, the statute of 
frauds is not a defense of which Stewart can avail 
himse · f; for by his representation and promise Stew-
art made himself primarily liable. The fact that pla :n-
tiff failed to prove that Stewart was the owner, or the 
fact that Stewart had no interest in the property, if 
that be a fact, is, we submit, after all, immaterial. 
The important question is: Did Stewart by his pro-
mise assume primary responsibility for that repair 
bill? Which the Court found he did. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
LEON FONNESBECK 
Attorney for Respondent. 
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